The Complexity of Admissibility in Omega-Regular Games

Iterated admissibility is a well-known and important concept in classical game theory, e.g. to determine rational behaviors in multi-player matrix games. As recently shown by Berwanger, this concept can be soundly extended to infinite games played on graphs with omega-regular objectives. In this paper, we study the algorithmic properties of this concept for such games. We settle the exact complexity of natural decision problems on the set of strategies that survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies. As a byproduct of our construction, we obtain automata which recognize all the possible outcomes of such strategies

Games on graphs with a public signal monitoring

We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic game abstraction, which conveniently allows to represent the knowledge of the players about these deviations, and give a characterization of Nash equilibria in terms of winning strategies in the abstraction. We then use the abstraction to develop algorithms for some payoff functions.Comment: 28 page

On Relevant Equilibria in Reachability Games

We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite directed graph equipped with target sets, one for each player. In those reachability games, it is known that there always exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). But sometimes several equilibria may coexist such that in one equilibrium no player reaches his target set whereas in another one several players reach it. It is thus very natural to identify "relevant" equilibria. In this paper, we consider different notions of relevant equilibria including Pareto optimal equilibria and equilibria with high social welfare. We provide complexity results for various related decision problems

The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Multiplayer Games

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In particular, we prove that the following problem is undecidable: Given a game~$\mathcal{G}$, does there exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of~$\mathcal{G}$ where player 0 wins with probability~$1$. Moreover, this problem remains undecidable if it is restricted to strategies with (unbounded) finite memory. However, if randomised strategies are allowed, decidability remains an open problem; we can only prove NP-hardness in this case. One way to obtain a provably decidable variant of the problem is to restrict the strategies to be positional or stationary. For the complexity of these two problems, we obtain a common lower bound of NP and upper bounds of NP and PSPACE respectively. Finally, we single out a special case of the general problem that, in many cases, admits an efficient solution. In particular, we prove that deciding the existence of an equilibrium in which each player either wins or loses with probability~$1$ can be done in polynomial time for games where, for instance, the objective of each player is given by a parity condition with a bounded number of priorities

Decision Problems for Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we single out several decidable restrictions of the problem. First, restricting the search space to stationary, or pure stationary, equilibria results in problems that are typically contained in PSPACE and NP, respectively. Second, we show that the existence of an equilibrium with a binary payoff (i.e. an equilibrium where each player either wins or loses with probability 1) is decidable. We also establish that the existence of a Nash equilibrium with a certain binary payoff entails the existence of an equilibrium with the same payoff in pure, finite-state strategies.Comment: 22 pages, revised versio

The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Simple Stochastic Multiplayer Games

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multiplayer games. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In particular, we prove that the following problem is undecidable: Given a game G, does there exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of G where player 0 wins with probability 1. Moreover, this problem remains undecidable if it is restricted to strategies with (unbounded) finite memory. However, if mixed strategies are allowed, decidability remains an open problem. One way to obtain a provably decidable variant of the problem is restricting the strategies to be positional or stationary. For the complexity of these two problems, we obtain a common lower bound of NP and upper bounds of NP and PSPACE respectively.Comment: 23 pages; revised versio

Parametric LTL on Markov Chains

This paper is concerned with the verification of finite Markov chains against parametrized LTL (pLTL) formulas. In pLTL, the until-modality is equipped with a bound that contains variables; e.g., $\Diamond_{\le x}\ \varphi$ asserts that $\varphi$ holds within $x$ time steps, where $x$ is a variable on natural numbers. The central problem studied in this paper is to determine the set of parameter valuations $V_{\prec p} (\varphi)$ for which the probability to satisfy pLTL-formula $\varphi$ in a Markov chain meets a given threshold $\prec p$, where $\prec$ is a comparison on reals and $p$ a probability. As for pLTL determining the emptiness of $V_{> 0}(\varphi)$ is undecidable, we consider several logic fragments. We consider parametric reachability properties, a sub-logic of pLTL restricted to next and $\Diamond_{\le x}$, parametric B\"uchi properties and finally, a maximal subclass of pLTL for which emptiness of $V_{> 0}(\varphi)$ is decidable.Comment: TCS Track B 201

Computer aided synthesis: a game theoretic approach

In this invited contribution, we propose a comprehensive introduction to game theory applied in computer aided synthesis. In this context, we give some classical results on two-player zero-sum games and then on multi-player non zero-sum games. The simple case of one-player games is strongly related to automata theory on infinite words. All along the article, we focus on general approaches to solve the studied problems, and we provide several illustrative examples as well as intuitions on the proofs.Comment: Invitation contribution for conference "Developments in Language Theory" (DLT 2017

Modification of a PE/PPE substrate pair reroutes an Esx substrate pair from the mycobacterial ESX-1 type VII secretion system to the ESX-5 system

Bacterial type VII secretion systems secrete a wide range of extracellular proteins that play important roles in bacterial viability and in interactions of pathogenic mycobacteria with their hosts. Mycobacterial type VII secretion systems consist of five subtypes, ESX-1-5, and have four substrate classes, namely, Esx, PE, PPE, and Esp proteins. At least some of these substrates are secreted as heterodimers. Each ESX system mediates the secretion of a specific set of Esx, PE, and PPE proteins, raising the question of how these substrates are recognized in a system-specific fashion. For the PE/PPE heterodimers, it has been shown that they interact with their cognate EspG chaperone and that this chaperone determines the designated secretion pathway. However, both structural and pulldown analyses have suggested that EspG cannot interact with the Esx proteins. Therefore, the determining factor for system specificity of the Esx proteins remains unknown. Here, we investigated the secretion specificity of the ESX-1 substrate pair EsxB_1/EsxA_1 in Mycobacterium marinum Although this substrate pair was hardly secreted when homologously expressed, it was secreted when co-expressed together with the PE35/PPE68_1 pair, indicating that this pair could stimulate secretion of the EsxB_1/EsxA_1 pair. Surprisingly, co-expression of EsxB_1/EsxA_1 with a modified PE35/PPE68_1 version that carried the EspG5 chaperone-binding domain, previously shown to redirect this substrate pair to the ESX-5 system, also resulted in redirection and co-secretion of the Esx pair via ESX-5. Our results suggest a secretion model in which PE35/PPE68_1 determines the system-specific secretion of EsxB_1/EsxA_1